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Abstract
This Article attempts to describe certain characteristics of Latin American legal culture that
have jurisprudential implications and to inquire into certain themes of jurisprudence in the context
of these cultural characteristics. A syncretic approach to jurisprudence may allow Latin American countries to formulate ideas about, and potential solutions to, widely recognized fundamental
problems in their legal systems. Section I of this Article examines four conflicts between law and
society in Latin America: 1) the conflict between the customary law of the informal sector and
formal law, 2) the conflict between the bureaucratic ideal of the civil law judge and the heterogeneous, evolving social realities in Latin America, 3) the widespread evasion of formal law in Latin
America, often to accomplish socially and economically desirable transactions, and 4) the de facto
legitimacy of non-constitutional governments and the laws they enact as a longstanding tradition
in Latin America. Section II of this Article uses these conflicts as a basis for making fundamental inquiries into the nature of law in Latin America. Section II also compares certain dominant
themes in the jurisprudence of the United States with Latin American jurisprudence and identifies
the fundamental distinction between the two legal cultures: the idealist, philosophical approach
of Latin America as opposed to the pragmatic, anti-philosophical approach of the United States.
Section II further posits that while Latin American thinkers may be uncomfortable with explicit
recognition of North American realist thought and other North American schools of jurisprudence,
certain parallels are apparent and borrowings may be productive. Section III provides concluding
observations.

ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LATIN AMERICA
John Linarelli*
There is a clear lack of perception, within the Judiciary or
within society, that the administration of justice is a service
performed for the citizenry, rather than something done to the
citizenry.1
INTRODUCTION
From the 1930s until very recently, Latin American countries adhered to statist policies designed to achieve development' through government intervention, protectionism, and
regulation. Starting with Chile in the 1970s, Latin American
countries sought to reverse these policies in favor of market-oriented economics, free trade, competition, and deregulation. 4
They have adopted contemporary ideas on the economics of development.5 Latin American countries embraced democracy
* Partner, BRAVERMAN & LINARELLI; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law

Center and the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law; Project Director, International Law Institute. Duquesne University, B.A. magna cum laude, 1981; The
American University Washington College of Law, J.D., 1985; Georgetown University
Law Center, LL.M. (International and Comparative Law) with distinction, 1996.
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank") Project Implementation Document, Peru-Administration of Justice Project 1 (June 12,
1995).
2. The term "development" is elusive. In this paper, the term refers broadly to the
economic, social, and political development of a country. In developing countries, the
goal of development would plausibly be poverty alleviation. See generally WORLD BANK,
POVERTY REDUCTION HANDBOOK 1 (1993). With such a goal, the primary emphasis
would seem to be on economic development. Economic development, however, has
social and political ramifications. See Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the "New" International Law, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 n.5 (1995) (attempting to define economic development). Moreover, development may be characterized in the human rights context as
involving the promotion of economic and social rights, or as a soft "right to development". See Roland Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 287 (1983) (analyzing various potential sources for human right to development); Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: TheJurisprudenceand Politics of the Right to
Development, 15 CAL. W. INr'L LJ.473 (1985) (discussing human right to development).
3.

SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, CRISIS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA"

FROM DESPAIR TO

(1995).
4. Id.
5. See generallyJames H. Weaver & Kevin M. O'Keefe, WhitherDeelopmentEconomics?
11 SAIS REv. 113 (1991) (discussing theories in development economics).
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contemporaneously with these sweeping economic reforms.6 All
of the Latin American countries except Cuba have elected national governments. 7 As these changes have occurred, Latin
American countries have had to rethink the role of the state. s
The governments of Latin American countries, for the most
part, have been characterized by strong, intrusive executive
branches. 9 Yet they have been weak in providing what the World
Bank calls "good governance," particularly in the area of law.' 0
They have suffered from extremely weak and sometimes nonexistent legislatures. From the very beginning of the law and development movement, Latin American judiciaries and legal systems
generally have been the subjects of a great deal of scholarship as
well as aid. The United States'" has had a particularly strong
interest in the region. Despite the widespread criticism of Latin
American judiciaries, they have performed relatively well, even
in the face of many disadvantages and sometimes in the face of
physical danger.12
Latin American countries have no shortage of elegantly
drafted codes, constitutions, and legislation. Indeed, some have
said that the Civil Code of Chile, prepared by Andr~s Bello,
reads like literature. 3 The tradition of such laws is longstanding
6. See Robert G.Vaughn, ProposalsforJudicialReform In Chile, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
577, 578 (1993) (stating that in Latin America, "[t]he fall of military governments as
well as the rejection of planned economies has created a number of democratic, market-oriented economies ....").
7. The transition to democracy, however, is "far from complete." Irwin P. Stotzky
& Carlos S. Nino, The Difficulties of the Transition Process, in TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 3 (Irwin P. Stotzky, ed. 1993) [hereinafter
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY].
8. ShahidJaved Burki, Economic Development andJudicial Reform, in JUDICIAL REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 11

(Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter WORLD BANK PROCEEDINGS].
9. See Carlos S. Nino, The Debate Over ConstitutionalReform in Latin America, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 635, 641-43 (1993) (discussing "hyper-presidentialism" in Latin
America).
10. Burki, supra note 8 at 11.
11. In this Article I have attempted to avoid using the term "American" or

"America" to refer to "United States" because the first two words may be construed as
referring to the entire Western Hemisphere, See PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAw AND POLICY vii (1993)

(providing guidance on

this approach).
12. Keith S. Rosenn, JudicialReview in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 785, 809-10
(1974) [hereinafter JudicialReview in Latin America].
13. Professor Roberto G.MacLean, Comparative Law Latin America course at Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1994.
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in Latin America. A dominant theme in the examination of
Latin American legal systems has been that law in Latin America,
in many respects, has failed to reflect the heterogeneous social
realities of its people, is ignored or evaded by many segments of
the population, and is unjust in its application by courts. This
dysfunction between law and society has become even more
grave as the citizens of Latin American countries feel the pressures of urban migration, population growth, and economic
debilitation from the 1980's debt crisis. The lessons that can be
derived from Latin America are evident. Particularly, countries
in transition from socialism, in Central and Eastern Europe and
elsewhere, should heed these lessons as they either build or reconstitute their legal systems to function in the context of globally integrated market-oriented economic systems.
This Article attempts to describe certain characteristics of
Latin American legal culture that have jurisprudential implications1 4 and to inquire into certain themes of jurisprudence in
the context of these cultural characteristics. A syncretic approach to jurisprudence may allow Latin American countries to
formulate ideas about, and potential solutions to, widely recog15
nized fundamental problems in their legal systems.
14. One must be careful to avoid confusion between the English word "jurisprudence" and the Spanish word 'jurisprudencia." The English word means the study of
the philosophy of law. The Spanish word is frequently used as the Latin American

equivalent of case law or precedent. Latin Americans typically refer to what AngloAmericans call jurisprudence as simply philosophy of law. Even a well-known SpanishEnglish English-Spanish Dictionary confuses the terms by providing both meanings in
the definition of each word. See WEST'S SPANISH-ENGLISH ENGLISH-SPANISH DICTIONARY

196, 565 (1992).
15. Before continuing, a few caveats. In this Article, I have strived to avoid an
approach that would risk the label "legal imperialist." See Francis G. Snyder, The Failure
of "Lawand Development," 1982 Wis. L. REv. 373, 373 (1982). Professor Snyder describes
the law and development movement of the 1960's and 1970's as follows:
The movement embodied the ethnocentric, ahistorical assumption that the
'modernization" of underdeveloped countries would approximate the pattern
of American capitalist development, in which specific, usually idealized forms
of law were tacitly presumed to be central. Consequently, it encouraged underdeveloped countries to adopt ideas about law and to establish legal institutions and systems of legal education similar to those in the United States.
Id.; see generally Richard Stith, Can PracticeDo Without Theory: Differing Answers in Western
Legal Education, 4 IND. INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 1, 1 (1993). I am a common law lawyer
with the sense of my legal culture imbued in me by my life experiences in litigation and
corporate transactions in the United States. No doubt those who disagree with me will
label me an imperialist nonetheless. I have strived to make this Article descriptive and
not prescriptive, although it is difficult to draw bright lines and an Article of this nature
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Section I of this Article examines four conflicts between law
and society in Latin America: 1) the conflict between the customary law of the informal sector and formal law, 2) the conflict
between the bureaucratic ideal of the civil lawjudge and the heterogeneous, evolving social realities in Latin America, 3) the
widespread evasion of formal law in Latin America, often to accomplish socially and economically desirable transactions, and
4) the defacto legitimacy of non-constitutional governments and
the laws they enact as a longstanding tradition in Latin America.
Section II of this Article uses these conflicts as a base to make
cannot be purely descriptive. ProfessorJohn Henry Merryman, in his work on the decline of the law and development movement, suggested that the future of the movement might be in scholarship focused on inquiry and theory rather than action. John
H. Merryman, ComparativeLaw and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival
of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMp. L. 457, 481 (1977) [hereinafter
ComparativeLaw and Social Change]. Although the law and development movement has
been discredited in the academy, it is alive and well in practice. The United States
Agency for International Development ("USAID") funds numerous "rule of law"
projects, most notably in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet bloc
countries. The World Bank, moreover, is significantly involved in judicial reform. Indeed, the second volume of essays by the General Counsel of the World Bank, Ibrahim
Shihata, contains a section on judicial reform and the role of the World Bank. In this
Article, I attempt to follow Merryman's suggestion by, inter alia, examining how Latin
American legal systems actually function, and identifying why Latin American courts
and law do not reflect social reality. See HowardJ. Wiarda, Law and PoliticalDevelopment
inLatin America: Toward a FrameworkforAnalysis, 19 Am.J. COMp. L. 434, 461-62 (1971).
Wiarda stated:
It would seem ... that as scholars concerned with the process of Latin American development - including the place of law and legal institutions in that
process - we should be concerned not so much with devising schemes to
close ... supposed 'gaps' [between the niceties of legal-constitutional structures and the harsh realities of political life] or with providing prescriptive
remedies for the real or imagined 'ills' of the Latin American nations that are
usually based on some Western European or Anglo-American conception of
the way the development process ought to proceed. Instead, we must recognize and come to grips with the dilemmas of Latin American underdevelopment realistically, on its own terms and in its own context.
Id. Professor Wiarda, however, bases these conclusions on the premise that Latin American legal systems are capable of promoting development through "ingenious patchwork solutions" and that "a little 'grease' here or a little cement there" may be sufficient. Id. at 462. This Article, in contrast, identifies some basic ideas in jurisprudence,
the foundation for a legal system, that may be of guidance to Latin American lawyers
and legal scholars. I do not believe that "telling it like it is" is legal imperialism, even
though it does reflect a core idea in Anglo-American realist, and possibly pragmatist,
jurisprudence. It would seem obvious that law reform efforts, as well as law and development scholarship, should focus on "what the community is already doing." SeeJack A.
Hiller, Lawyers, Alternative Lawyers, and Alternatives to Lawyers: Of Thomas Hobbes and Rumpelstiltskin, 1985 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1985) (making analogy to public
health policy).
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fundamental inquiries into the nature of law in Latin America.
Section II also compares certain dominant themes in the jurisprudence of the United States with Latin American jurisprudence and identifies the fundamental distinction between the
two legal cultures; the idealist, philosophical approach of Latin
America as opposed to the pragmatic, anti-philosophical approach of the United States. Section II further posits that while
Latin American thinkers may be uncomfortable with explicit recognition of North American realist thought and other North
American schools of jurisprudence, certain parallels are apparent and borrowings may be productive. Section III provides concluding observations. 6

I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY IN
LA TIN AMERICA
Professor John Henry Merryman, in his basic work on the
civil law tradition, explains that civil law scholars agree:
[T] hat the purity of legal science - its rejection of everything
considered nonlegal - has had the effect of separating law
from the life of society whose problems should be its basic
concern. This social, economic, and political antagonism has
cut the law off from the rest of the culture, and has made
17
lawyers less and less relevant to social needs.
Merryman explains that this and other criticisms "have special
force and relevance in developing nations within the civil law
world, particularly in Latin America.""8 Merryman continues:
There [Latin America] the argument can be most persuasively made that the legal process is lagging behind the rest of
the culture, sometimes inadequate as a vehicle for economic
and social change that should be put into legal form, sometimes inherently opposed to such change, and with increasing
16. This Article has some obvious inherent limitations. The study of Latin Ameri-

can law requires significant long-term experience in Latin America. See H.H.A. Cooper
& Dale B. Furnish, Latin America: A Challenge to the Common Lawyer, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 435,

437 (1969) (stating, "[n]o one, even someone enjoying perfect fluency in Spanish and
no problems in locating the sources of the law, could come down for four to six months

and produce a sound study of any topic in Peruvian law.").
17. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION: AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 147-48 (1985) [hereinafter
CIVIL LAw TRADITION].

18. Id. at 148.
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frequency irrelevant to it.' 9
Latin American and North American lawyers, scholars, and
public policy figures have often advanced these propositions
about Latin American legal systems. The momentum for fundamental change, however, has been insufficient, particularly when
the major funding organizations, such as the World Bank and
the United States Agency for International Development
("USAID"), do not focus financing on issues of such basic significance. This section analyzes four areas in which there has been
a recognition of the conflict between law and social reality in
Latin America and their adverse effects on development.
It is difficult to generalize about law in the many countries
that comprise Latin America. There are common features, however, that manifest themselves in many Latin American countries. These features are systemic in nature and do not concern
the intricacies of rule comparisons. Moreover, the similar characteristics do not concern issues of administration of justice,
such as the problems of judicial delay, court inefficiency, and
lack of infrastructure endemic in many of the judicial systems of
the Latin American countries. Rather, the characteristics analyzed below focus on the legal culture of Latin America generally.
A. The Informal Sector and Its Description: Formal Versus
Informal Law
There has been a great deal of study of the informal sector2'
in Latin American countries. A significant amount of the research focuses on the economic aspects of the informal sector.
The research also raises the fundamental questions of what constitutes "law" and whether the formally sanctioned law of a coun19. Id.

20. Professor Jane Kaufman Winn has collected various definitions of the "informal economy" and stated:
The informal economy is also known as "black, cash, clandestine, irregular,
parallel, subterranean, secret, shadow, submerged ....

The informal econ-

omy is also described as "underground" or "secondary" in social science literature ....

[Two social scientists] define the informal economy by one central

feature: "It is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social
environment in which similar activities are regulated."
Jane Kaufman Winn, How to Make Poor Countries Rich and How to Enrich OurPoor, 77 IowA

L. RE,. 899, 900 n. 5 (1992) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Poor Countries Rich].
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try is a positive force for development.2 1
In an early study of the barrios 22 in Caracas, Venezuela, one
Venezuelan lawyer described the barrios as a 'jungle." 2' Examinations of what really happens in the informal communities in
Latin America have revealed that this is clearly an inaccurate description.
Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist performed a
prominent and controversial examination of the informal sector.
In his book The Other Path,24 de Soto detailed the social realities
of the informals in Lima, Peru. De Soto discovered norms as
they actually applied in society. De Soto found an extensive "system of extralegal norms" governing property acquisition, trade,
transportation systems, dispute resolution, and community governance.25 He explained these extralegal norms as follows:
Consisting essentially of informal customary law and of rules
borrowed from the official legal system when they are of use
to informals, the system of extralegal norms is called on to
govern life in the informal settlements when the law is absent
or deficient. It is the "law" that has been created by informals
to regulate and order their
lives and transactions and, as
26
such, is socially relevant.
As the above quotation explains, the informal law that de Soto
describes can in some cases borrow features from the formal
legal system in Peru. For example, the formal legal system may
promulgate a statute or decree that provides a measure of formal legal recognition of informal trading in the form of excise
taxes. Payment of these excise taxes allows street vendors to
trade on streets and sidewalks, but does not convey any property
21. See Elliot M. Burg, Law andDevelopment: A Review of the Literature & a Critique of
"Scholarsin Self Estrangement," 25 Am.J. COMP. L. 492, 500-01 (1977) (providing various
definitions of "law").
22. Barrios is defined as the "poor quarter" or "slums". POCKET SPANISH DICTIONARY 54 (Langenscheidt Editorial Staff ed., 1985).
23. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA 586 (1975); KENNETH L. KARST ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIOS
OF CARACAS 3 (1973) [hereinafter EVOLUTION OF LAW]; Kenneth L. Karst, Rights in Land
and Housing in an Informal Legal System: The Barrios of Caracas, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 550,
558 (1971) [hereinafter Rights in Land and Housing].
24. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD xix (1989). The Instituto de Libertad y Democracia (ILD), located in
Lima, Peru, conducted the research for the book. De Soto was the director of the ILD.
25. Id. at 13-14, 19.
26. Id. at 19.
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rights in the areas occupied. Levying these taxes provides additional security to certain "special rights of ownership" that are
recognized in the informal legal system as being held by a vendor occupying a certain location.2 7
For the informals in de Soto's study, the formal legal system
is oppressive and serves only elite interests. As Mario Vargas
Llosa stated, "[w] hen legality is a privilege available only to those
with political and economic power, those excluded - the poor
have no alternative but illegality." 8 One notable exercise undertaken by de Soto was the establishment of a fictitious company in Peru, which took 289 days, required the payment of two
bribes (although ten were solicited), and cost US$1231 in expenses and lost wages to incorporate.2 9 In such a situation, a
person of limited means in a developing country such as Peru
would have no choice but to conduct business outside of the formal legal sector, as a matter of survival.
In Latin America, there traditionally has been a strict aversion to custom in the formal legal system. One of the most important principles in the drafting of the Chilean Civil Code, for
example, was the "omnipotence of the law."30 Because of this
omnipotence, "custom is not law, save in exceptional cases when
the law expressly provides that custom has the force of law."'"
This attitude is pervasive even in contemporary revisions of Latin
American civil codes. Article 1 of the Peruvian Civil Code, for
example, revised and in force since November 1984, prohibits
32
the application of custom that derogates from the formal law.
This has substantial ramifications for both traditional custom
manifested in the substantial indigenous populations of Peru, 3
and for the modern custom of the informals. Native societies
have centuries old normative institutions that formal legal sys27. Id. at 66-68.
28. Id. at xiv.
29. Id. at xii, 133-34.
30. Juan G. Matus Valencia, Comment, The Centenary of the Chilean Civil Code, 7 Am.
J. CoMp. L. 71, 75 (1957).
31. Id.
32. C6digo Civil, art. 1 (Peru) ("La ley se deroga s6lo por otra ley." [A law is only
repealed by another law]); Dante Cracogna, La costumbre como fuente del derecho en el
nuevo Codigo Civil peruano, in EL CODIGO CIL PERUANO Y EL SISTEMA JURIDICO LATINOAMERICANO 80 (1986) (code supersedes conflicting custom).
33. See Javier Aroca Medina, Pueblos indigenasy familia en el derecho peruano. Una
aproximacion a esta problematica,7 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 131, 131 (1994).
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tems in Latin America have, at best, reluctantly and sporadically
recognized.34 Moreover, there has been a great proliferation of
uncodified and unwritten principles in the twentieth century
with the rise of the informals in Latin America. In a sense, there
has been a rise of common law in Latin America. 3 The alternative systems of governance and their norms of social and economic behavior constitute "legal systems" and "law." This "law"
is not recognized as such in the formal legal system, although
there have been some attempts at a modicum of recognition.
De Soto was, for a time, a close advisor to President Alberto
Fujimori of Peru, but left the Fujimori Government in 1991.
Soon thereafter, de Soto became an outspoken critic of
Fujimori's April 1992 coup and dissolution of the Peruvian Congress. 6 De Soto, however, did begin a number of law reform
projects in Peru.37 The Peruvian Government, through a reform
program initiated in 1990, at least partly under the influence of
de Soto, began to limit the role of the state in the economic
sphere. Notably, he worked with the Peruvian legislature in preparing legislation which grants formal legal title to informal land
38
holders in Lima.

Informal sectors are not unique to Peru. They exist in many
Latin American countries, as well as in many countries outside of
Latin America, including the United States.39 The World Bank
34. Professor Roberto G. MacLean, Comparative Law: Latin America course, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1994.
35. Id.
36. Poor Countries Rich, supra note 20, at 937-39; see Marie Arana-Ward, Peru's Shaky

Miracle: Fujimori'sSuccess Pleases the People, but not the Elite, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at
C03; Don Podesta, S. America's Trickle-Down Democracy: Elected Rulers Find Ways to Impose
ProgramsOver Faction-RiddenLegislatures, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1992, at A28; see Nathaniel
C. Nash, In Peru, a 'Second Coup' Reveals the Upper Hand, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993, at 6
(discussing Fujimori's coup and dissolution of Congress).
37. Joel Millman, The Next Path: PeruvianEconomist Hernando de Soto's Land Reform
Plan, FORBES, May 23, 1994, at 106; Arana-Ward, supra note 36, at C03; see U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Market Research Report, Peru, Investment Climate Statement, Oct. 28, 1994 (discussing reform program begun in 1990) (on file with author).
38. Millman, supra note 37, at 106.
39.

THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD

1 (Vito Tanzi

ed., 1982) [hereinafter UNDERGROUND ECONOMY] (discussing informal economies in
United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Sweden, former U.S.S.R., Canada, Colombia, Australia, and Israel); see BEYOND REGULATION: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN
LATIN AMERICA 5 (Victor E. Tokman ed., 1992) [hereinafter BEYOND REGULATION] (discussing methodology used in studies of informals in many Latin American countries);
Jane Kaufman Winn, RelationalPracticesand the Marginalizationof Law: InformalFinancial
Practicesof Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAw & Soc'y REv. 193, 194 (1994) [hereinafter
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has financed projects for certain Latin American countries to assist in the formalization of informal activities. Many U.S. legal
scholars have taken a realist approach at documenting the law of
the informal sector in Latin America.40
In Latin American countries' efforts to grapple with informality, governments have promulgated legislation outside of the
codes, in a tacit recognition that the codes fail to reflect social
reality. 41 This is viewed, in one sense, as an obvious fact of life in

contemporary civil law jurisdictions. Merryman calls this legislation "special legislation" or "microsystems of law."' 42 Such legislation is not the product of professors preparing codes in a social
vacuum, on the basis of legal science, but is the result of compromise in an effort to deal with heterogeneous forces in a society of
great potential power and danger to the status quo. De Soto recognized this compromise in his examination of Peru's initial
resistance and eventual accommodation of the informals.43
It is doubtful whether Latin American countries will be able
to fundamentally change and fully accommodate the informals.
Latin Americans have an ambivalent relationship with law. In
one respect, they ignore it. On the other hand, they possess a
basic faith, an idealistic belief in the legislative paradigm, that
legislation can solve all problems." For example, Professor
Keith Rosenn recounts a satire of lawmaking in Brazil, told by
Relational Practices]; see generally Symposium: The Informal Economy, 103 YALE L. J. 2119,
2119-2335 (1994) (focusing on informals in United States but also addressing de Soto
and informals in other countries).
40. For notable works by law and development scholars of the 1960's and 1970's see
e.g., Burg, supra note 21, at 492; Kenneth L. Karst, Latin-American Land Reform: The Uses
of Confiscation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 327 (1964) [hereinafter Latin-American Land Reform];
KARST & ROSENN, supra note 23, at 3; Kenneth A. Manaster, The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 23 (1968); William A. Doebele, The
Private Market and Low Income Urbanization: The "Pirate"Subdivisions of Bogota, 25 Am. J.
COMP. L. 531 (1977); Joseph R. Thome, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968
Wis. L. REv. 9 (1968).
41. Brazil, for example, has promulgated a "Microenterprise Statute" to register
informal businesses so as to bring them into the formal sector. Johanna W. Looye, Real
Versus Ideal and the Brazilian Jeitinho: A Study of Microenterprise Registry Under the New
MicroenterpriseStatute, in BEYOND REGULATION, supra note 39, at 109.
42. CIwL LAw TRADITION, supra note 17, at 151-52; see Luis Quifie Arista, Doctrina:
Una opinion sobre la reforma judicial, 34 REVISTA DE JURISPRUDENCIA PERUANA 1033, 1040
(1975).
43. DE SOTO, supra note 24, at 33, 75, 105.
44. See Relational Practices,supra note 39, at 202 (noting similar ambivalence in Tai-

wan).
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the former Planning Minister of the country, Roberto de
Oliveira Campos. De Oliveira Campos suggested a Decree Law
No. 001, which "[r]egulates the [1]aw of [s]upply and [d]emand
45
and [p]rohibits the [s]carcity of [m]oney or [m]erchandise."
The decree repeals inflation and the shortage of credit.4 6 Passage of such idealistic legislation continues today. In Peru, for
example, after de Soto's departure, Fujimori enacted, in accordance with a sweeping delegation of legislative authority to him, a
Framework Law for Private Investment Growth.4 7 This Law provides, among other things, that "the state guarantees free private
initiative,"4 8 that "free competition means that prices in the
economy are the result of supply and demand,"49 and that "the
State guarantees economic plurality."5 0
Unlike studies done by others, de Soto takes a controversial,
classical economic approach to making policy recommendations
based on free markets and individualism.5 1 He has struck a discordant note with some scholars. Professor Jane Kaufman Winn
has criticized de Soto for failing to consider the noneconomic
implications of informality. 52 Winn contends that de Soto's documentation of the informals fails to consider race, class, and
gender.5" Ricardo Lagos, an economist, has criticized de Soto's
54
work as unscientific and based on inadequate sampling.
45. Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito, Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the FormalLegal System
and its Development Implications, 19 AM.J. COMP. L. 514, 529 n.43 (1971) [hereinafter The
Jeito].
46. Id.
47. Decreto Legislativo No. 757, Ley Marco para el Crecimiento de la Inversi6n
Privada, Nov. 6, 1992, reprintedin La Nueva Legislaci6n Comercial Peruana (June 1993).
48. Id. art. 2.
49. Id. art. 3.
50. Id. art. 5.
51. Scholars attribute Friedrich A. Hayek as the basis for de Soto's approach. Poor
Countries Rich, supra note 20, at 914.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ricardo A. Lagos, Barriers to Legality and Their Costs for the Informal Sector, in
BEYOND RECULATION, supra note 39, at 87, 104-05. This Article does not address the

normative implications of de Soto's work. Rather, it focuses on de Soto's descriptions
of informal law and not on whether informal law produces social justice or is fair. I am
examining de Soto's research, and the research of others, from the standpoint of
whether it sets forth a description of norms that are in the nature of law, and the implications resulting from these norms, from the perspective of jurisprudence or philosophy of law. Issues such as how or whether governments should seek to change these
norms, or how or whether the norms result in an appropriate income distribution,
serve appropriate ends of social policy, or achieve social justice are for other Articles,
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B. Judging

Scholarly literature reflects a broad consensus that Latin
American judiciaries fail to properly reconcile law with social realities. Presented here are two aspects of this phenomenon.
The first aspect pertains to judicial discretion, while the second
is related to the issue of judicial review.
1. Judicial Discretion
With the exception of certain Caribbean countries, the legal
systems of Latin American countries are based on the civil law
tradition.5 5 Latin American countries inherited their formal
legal systems from their continental European colonizers. The
Latin American codes, thus, originate in Roman Law and European codes.56 The civil law axiom of social order is that of reason. Civil law, although emanating from Roman Law and the jus
civile ofJustinian, had its ascendancy in European thought in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during the Enlightenment
and the Age of Reason." Philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant,
who contended that all problems associated with human activity
could be resolved through reason influenced the great civil
codes of that time.5 8 In the civil law system, law is considered a
science.
The legislature has the foremost role in achieving rationality in human civility. The resulting codes, codification, and legislation serve as the bases for civil law. In a pure civil law jurisdiction, there is no case law or stare decisis.5 9 The codes, particularly
the civil code, are supposed to resolve all societal conflicts in
advance.6 0
preferably based on rigorous social science methodologies. As explained above, in this

Article I attempt to avoid action-oriented analysis. The norms of the informal sector
are pertinent to this Article to the extent that they reflect the social realities of Latin
America in a manner different than formal law.
55. Professor Roberto G. MacLean, Comparative Law: Latin America course, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1994.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Stare decisis is the principle where courts follow earlier decisions on principles of law, even though later parties before the court were not parties to the earlier
case. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 60 (1996).
60. The Napoleonic Code, promulgated in 1804, sets forth the ideals of the civil
law as:
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It is widely believed that codification in Latin America, and
formal law generally in Latin America, have largely failed to
serve societal needs. 61 The emphasis in the Latin American legal
community has been on the systematic development of codes in
the abstract, based on juristic writings and doctrine, with inadequate attention paid to social realities in a country.6 2 Legal
scholars in this archetypal civil law model "will criticize legislation, but not on the basis of its probable social or economic effects. They will discuss its consistency with the tenets of legal
science, the quality of its draftsmanship, and its compatibility
with the established conceptual system. ' 63 Civil law lawyers who
critically examine their own legal systems have widely criticized
this legal science model.6 4
The ideal of the civil law is based on legislative supremacy.
Montesquieu has said that judges are the "mouths that pronounce the words of the law."6 5 Andr~s Bello has said that
judges "are slaves of the law." 66 One Latin American judge has
said, "[i]n Latin America the legislature is considered like a god
and the judge is considered not even a man. '6 7 The ideal of
legislative supremacy stands in remarkable contrast to the realiGood civil laws are the best thing people can give and receive; they are at the
origin of good morals, the palladium of property and the guarantee of public
and private peace.... They reach every individual, they affect the main events
in his life, they follow him everywhere; . . .they are a consolation for each
sacrifice the law requires of its citizens for the sake of society, by protecting
them, their person and their property.
Discours pr61iminaire, an. IX, reprinted in Yvon Mercier, Reform of the Civil Code, the Legal
Aid System, and Technology in the Administration ofJustice in Quibec, inWORLD BANK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, at 134.

61. See KARST & RoSENN, supra note 23, at 47; Jorge Witker, Derecho, desarrollo y
formacio'njurdica,65 REVISTA DEL FORO 35, 38 (1978); Boris Kozolchyk, Commercial Law
Recodification and Economic Development in Latin America, 4 LAWYER AMERICAS 189, 195
(1973) [hereinafter Commercial Law]; STEVEN LOWENSTEIN, LAWYERS, LEGAL EDUCATION,
AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN CHILE

55 (1970).

62. Roberto G. MacLean, JudicialDiscretion in the Civil Law, 43 LA. L. REv. 45, 48
(1982) [hereinafter JudicialDiscretion]; see Roberto G. MacLean, JudicialReasoning and

Social Reality in Peru, 28 Am.J. COMP. L. 489, 490 (1980) [hereinafterJudicialReasoning].
63. CIVIL LAW TRADITION, supra note 17, at 81.

64. Id. at 145.
65. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)
quoted in Jorge Correa Sutil, The Judiciary and the PoliticalSystem in Chile: The Dilemmas of
Judicial Independence During the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY,
supra note 7, at 93.
66. ANDRtS BELLO, ESCRITOS JURIDICOS, POLITICOS Y UNIVERSITARIOs 75 (1979)

quoted in Correa Sutil, supra note 65, at 93.
67. Roberto MacLean Ugarteche, Introduccidn al estudio comparado de los sistemas
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ties of the low prestige, precarious nature, and, sometimes, even
nonexistence of legislatures in Latin America. 68 The states of
Latin America have only recently begun to embrace democracy. 69 At present, the focus is on elections. Elections alone,
however, do not produce democracy. The countries of Latin
America currently have the beginnings of democracy, albeit
"thin" or "superficial" democracy. One component of a viable
democracy is a functioning legislature, a feature historically absent in Latin American governments." The executive frequently
has taken over the functions of the legislature in Latin America
and laws often have been promulgated by executive decree.
Often the executive has been a military regime, promulgating
laws in a nontransparent manner, with little or no accountability.
Legislatures in Latin America have not been in a position to
promulgate laws that respond to societal needs and contexts. To
date, these legislatures remain ill equipped. They are overly reliant on the executive branch for information, 1 remain closed to
interest group views, and are unable to receive and reconcile important voices in society.7" They have a history, moreover, as being fora for ineffective rhetoric and no real legislative debate.7"
In some cases, they are nontransparent and unaccountable. As
Roberto MacLean explained in the context of Peru:
[L]egislation often is drafted without the necessary studies
and information. The national reality has just begun to be
explored and, faced with a lack of facts and figures and ignorant of precise situations to be regulated in many cases, legislation is done "by ear," frequently working from the legislative
models available from other countries. Recourse to comparative law as an aid to the legislator, if made injudiciously, carries with it the danger of causing a serious distortion of the
juridical function. Laws are a reflection of the conflicting interests existing in a society and its duty is to neutralize them
and put them in equilibrium. For this reason, when a law is
juridicos de las Americas in LIBRo HOMENAJE ULISES MONTOYA MANFREDI 457, 461 (Ro-

berto MacLean Ugarteche ed., 1989).
68. See DAVID CLOSE, LEGISLATURES AND THE NEW
8 (1995).
69. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 3-8.
70. See Nino, supra note 9, at 641-43.
71. CLOSE, supra note 68, at 2-3.
72. Id. at 24-26, 79.
73. Id. at 78.

DEMOCRACIES IN LATIN AMERICA 6-
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transplanted from one country to another, it may be then in
the new country the law does not satisfactorily resolve the
conflicts between interests, simply because the conflicts are
distinct. In such cases, they remain at least partially up in the
air and without resolution. 4
The result of weak or nonexistent legislatures is law that
fails to mesh with society. The Latin American countries may
not be in a position to adhere to the ideals of the civil law. Indeed, it may be that given the explosive pace at which Latin
American societies are evolving, combined with the heterogeneity of the population in many Latin American countries,7 5 the
goals of the civil law system in its purest and most rigorous sense
may be unachievable.
Despite the myth of legislative supremacy, Latin American
judges adhere to the paradigmatic model of the civilian judge.
As explained by Merryman, the civil law judge is "a kind of expert clerk." 76 Judges function as "strict and loyal law enforcers." 77 Their role is to "merely to find the right legislative provision, couple it with the fat situation, and bless the solution that
is more or less automatically produced from the union."7 ' The
decision, rendered by the court and not by any particular judge,
fits within the syllogism of Aristotelian logic; "[t]he major premise is in the statute, the facts of the case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows."7 9
The process is
highly formal. Adherence to the model is further heightened by
the existence of the crime of prevaricato, which provides for criminal punishment of a judge who fails to apply the law."° This
crime is given added prominence in Latin America because of
the history of strong executives in Latin American countries.
Latin American lawyers have advocated a shift away from
formalism in proposals reminiscent of Roscoe Pound's criticism
74. JudicialReasoning, supra note 62, at 490.
75. Id. at 489-90.
76. CIVIL LAw TRADITION, supra note 17, at 37.
77. DiARIo EL MERCURIO (Chile Newspaper), July 8, 1987, at Al, Al0 quoted in Cor-

rea Sutil, supra note 65, at 93 (stating Chilean Supreme Court's response to criticism
which indicated Court's belief that judges "must be strict appliers of the law.").
78. CiviL LAw TRADITION, supra note 17, at 37.
79. Id. at 37-38.
80. JudicialReasoning, supra note 62, at 493.
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of mechanical jurisprudence .8 Hernando Paris Rodriguez, of
the Costa Rican Supreme Court, recently stated:
[A] judge is not an automator that is merely called upon to
turn rules and facts into verdicts. Rather, he is a human being fulfilling a social role, called upon to make decisions in
accordance with the legal and cultural traditions and values
of the society in which he lives.82 '
Paris Rodriguez based his commentary on a speech given by
Judge Cervantes Villalta of the Costa Rican Supreme Court.
Judge Villalta condemned the lack of training ofjudges and lawyers in Latin America in the human aspect of the profession, and
stated, "[i] t is not enough to apply norms mechanically. Ajudge
has to weigh the social circumstances they are supposed to address."8 3
In several influential works, Roberto MacLean, a former
Judge of the Supreme Court of Peru and now counsel at the
World Bank, has advocated judicial discretion and judging to reflect social circumstances.8 4 According to MacLean, "[n]o legal
system can survive in any society without an acceptable degree of
judicial discretion."8 5 Of course, the Latin American judge has
at his disposal a number of devices to decide difficult cases, including the theory of abuse of right,86 general principles of
law,8 7 characterization or interpretation of facts, interpretation
81. See Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908) (criticizing view of'judge's role as formalistic applier of legal principles).

82. Hernando Paris Rodriguez, Improving the Administration ofJustice in Costa Rica,
in WORLD BANK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, at 201.
83. Id. at 200-01.
84. Roberto G. MacLean, El poder discrecional del juez, 71 REVISTA DEL FORO 9, 9
(1984) [hereinafter El poder discrecional]. At the time that the 1979 Peruvian Constitution was being prepared, MacLean proposed that the Constitution should give judges
the power to "distinguish" a case from the situation covered by an applicable code provision, in order to enforce the spirit if not the letter of the code provision. His proposal
was rejected.
85. JudicialDiscretion, supra note 62, at 49; El poder discrecional,supra note 84, at 13.
86. Article II of the Civil Code of Peru provides, "[l]a ley no ampara el ejercicio ni
la omisi6n abusivos de un derecho. Al demandar indemnizaci6n u otra pretensi6n, el
interesado puede solicitar las medidas cautelares apropiados para evitar o suprimir
provisionalmente el abuso." [ [t] he law does not extend to.the abusive exercise or omission of a right. To demand indemnification or other provisions, the party may request
appropriate cautious measures to provisionally avoid or suppress the abuse.] C6digo
civil, art. 2 (Peru).
87. Article VIII of the Civil Code of Peru provides, "[ljosjueces no pueden dejar
de administrarjusticia por defecto o deficiencia de la ley. En tales casos, deben aplicar
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of the law, discretion within the rules themselves, and other
"safeguard provisions.""
But there are perplexing cases in
which these devices are insufficient, where the gaps between law
and reality are too great for these devices to bridge, and where
there are clear deficiencies in the written law.8 9
In response to cynics who assert that the above critique may
be an attempt by Latin American lawyers to mimic North American legal realists in order to justify aid for legal reform, the late
Santiago Dantas, a leading Brazilian jurist, in a speech he made
in 1955 on reform of Latin American legal education, said as
follows:
In the study of abstract legal rules presented as a system one
los principios generales del derecho y, preferentemente, los que inspiran el derecho
peruano." [[t]he judges may not stop administering justice because of a defect or a
deficiency in the law. In such cases, they must apply the general principles of the law
and preferably, those which are based in Peruvian Law.] C6digo civil, art. 8 (Peru).
88. JudicialReasoning, supra note 62, at 492; seeJorge H. Bustamente Alsina, Funcion de la equidad en la realizaci6n de lajusticia, [1990-E] L.L. 628, 631 (1990) (Arg.).
89. MacLean cites the following example:
One case, heard also by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court in 1976,
illustrates this. It was a case of a woman from Cajamarca who at the age of
fifteen was seduced by the son of a family friend. To avoid sending the boy to
jail, they were made to marry, without ever living subsequently as husband and
wife. In fact they went their separate ways, the woman coming to live in Lima.
Through ignorance or poverty, she never worried about getting a divorce and
normalizing her situation. Several years later, she fell in love and began living
with a man from Lima, with whom she had three children. Her lover voluntarily recognized the first two as his children, but with the third, the woman had
to file a paternity suit. The evidence of paternity by the limemo [man from
Lima] was clear. Rarely is such convincing proof seen and the woman had
well-founded reasons to expect a favorable judgment. Nevertheless, the limeio
discovered or remembered that the woman had married in Cajamarca and
produced at trial the marriage record. Lamentably for the woman, art. 299 of
the Civil Code says, "The child born during a marriage or within three hundred days following its dissolution has as its father the husband." Furthermore, art. 300 maintains that, "The child is presumed legitimate, even though
the mother declares against his legitimacy or is condemned as an adulteress."
Art. 372 of the Civil Code establishes that only the husband may contradict
such paternity.
In these circumstances, there could be no question of deficiency in the
written law because the provision was too explicit. Nor could the doctrine of
abuse of right be applied because, after all, he who was entitled to the only
right which might have been exerted against the limefio's defense, the husband, was not a party to the action. Therefore, by presumption of the law and
against the inner-most convictions of the judges, judgment had to be given
against the woman.
JudicialReasoning, supra note 62, at 492-93.
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can easily lose the sense of the social, economic, or political
relationship the law is intended to control. The legal system
has a logical and rational value, autonomous, so to speak.
The study we make of this system, with strictly deductive and a
priori methods, leads to a condition of self-sufficiency which
enables a jurist to turn his back on the society and lose interest in the matter regulated 90as well as in the practical significance of the legal solution.
In European civil lawjurisdictions, the judicial syllogism has
been limited in significant respects. In Germany, it is plainly understood that codified law may be incomplete and ambiguous
and that courts may, in certain situations, deviate from legislated
rules. 9 A German judge may give weight to practical considerations and may interpret the text of a code as if he or she were
legislating "at the present time with knowledge of contemporary
conditions."9 2 The Germans have adopted these accommodative
approaches despite the backlash against legal realism in postWar Germany." German court decisions are relatively nontransparent, however, because judges render them in the forms of
deductive logic and syllogism.9 4
The Swiss Civil Code goes farther than the typical Latin
American code in that it allows the judge to act in accordance
with principles that he would have enacted were he a legislator. 5
Ibrahim Shihata, the General Counsel of the World Bank, advo90. A educafdo juridicae a crise brasileira, 13-14 REV.

JURiDICA

7, 18 (1955) quoted in

Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA.J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (1984).
91. Arthur T. Von Mehren, The Civil Law System, in LATIN AMERICAN LAW, BUSINESS
AND DEVELOPMENT 154-55 (Frank M. Lacey ed., 1975) [hereinafter LATIN AMERICAN
LAW, BUSINESS].

92. Id. at 155.
93. See Alexander Somek, From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing CriticalLegal Studies
from a Continental Perspective, 42 KAN. L. REv. 759, 762-63 (1994).
94. Von Mehren, supra note 91, at 154-55.
95. Swiss Civil Code, art. 1. The Swiss Civil Code states:
The Law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit
of any of its provisions.
Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide according to the existing Customary Law and, in default thereof, according to the rules which he
would law down if he had himself to act as legislator. Herein he must be
guided by approved legal doctrine and case law.
Swiss Civil Code, art. 1 in THE SwiSS CIL CODE: ENGLISH VERSION 1 (Ivy Williams et al.

trans., 1987).
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cates this approach.9 6 Shihata suggests that such an approach
may result in what Frangois Geny calls "free scientific research."9 7 Shihata also draws a parallel to Justice Benjamin Cardozo's contention that the judge would not "innovate at pleasure" but could "draw his inspiration from consecrated principles ...exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized
by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life."9 8 Shihata concludes:
Such a disciplined innovation may indeed be inevitable in the
modern world where sophisticated commercial practices
reach from the developed to the developing countries
through international business and finance, a process which
often includes adapting and adopting international codes
and statements of practice where no rules exist, for example,
in areas such as bills of exchange or letters of credit. 99
In France, orthodox theories retain more prevalence.1 00
Legal academics in France, however, propound a doctrine that
explains French law in a manner accommodative of social realities, quite apart from the "official portrait" of the judge as a strict
applier of law.10 1 This doctrine accompanies judicial decisions
in their published form and does, indeed, deal with the social
and policy ramifications of the law.'0 2 French magistrats, moreover, provide discursive arguments to accompany judicial decisions. 10 3 The magistratsoften base their arguments on policy and
not strictly on the wording of the codes. 10 4
There is movement in Latin America and elsewhere in the
civil law world away from purist approaches to civil law. Modification of the traditional role of the civilian judge is necessary in
96. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of the
World Bank, in WORLD BANK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, at 221.
97. II FRANcois GENv, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF: ESSAI CRITIQUE 77 (1919), quoted in Shihata, supra note 96, at 231.
98. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1949);
Shihata, supra note 96, at 231.
99. Shihata, supra note 96, at 231.
100. Von Mehren, supra note 91, at 155

101. Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the
French Legal System, 104 YALE L. J. 1325, 1344 (1995).
102. Id. at 1344-45.
103. Id. at 1328, 1355; In France, a magistrat is a body of judges and advocates
general that provide amicus curiae arguments to the courts. Id. at 1328, n.6.
104. Id. at 1328, 1355.
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Latin America to remediate serious disfunctions in the Latin
American legal systems which combine to cause serious injustice.
Deficient legislating, combined with explosive social change in a
heterogeneous society and with a lack of institutional capability
ofjudges to adapt to society, have resulted in a perception
of the
10 5
judiciary in Latin America as elitist and arbitrary.
2. Judicial Review
Latin American constitutions contain a variety of mechanisms for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. The systems of judicial review in Latin America are based on either the
diffuse, decentralized U.S. model, the concentrated, centralized
Austrian model, or on a mixture of these two "pure" models.6
Latin American countries have available, to varying degrees,
actions by which individuals, who are deprived of constitutional
rights, may seek redress from the judiciary. The better known
procedural devices are the Mexican amparo, the Argentine
amparo, the Brazilian habeas corpus, and the popular action in
Colombia.1"7 Because of widespread problems with enforcement of constitutional provisions in Peru, the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 contains a new action to compel Government officials to comply with the Constitution and other laws. These expanded procedural mechanisms are designed to provide courts
with the ability to review acts on constitutional grounds. They
are methods for reconciling social and legal-institutional interests. Such a reconciliation has great potential in Latin America
because Latin American constitutions tend to be twentieth century "social" constitutions that set forth significant economic and
social rights.
It is widely acknowledged, however, that these mechanisms
remain far from dynamic protectors of rights or progenitors of
social change. Latin American judiciaries have been criticized
105. See Judicial Reasoning, supra note 62, at 490-92.
106. See, e.g., Jorge Carpizo & Hctor Fix-Zamudio, La necesidady la legitimidad de la
revisitn judicialen Amrica Latina: Desarrollo reciente, 18 BOLETiN MEXICANO DE DERECHO
COMPARADO 31, 33-40 (1985); Alejandro M. Garro, Eficacia y autoridad del precedente en
America Latina: Las lecciones del derecho comparado, 20 INTER-AM. L. REv. 473, 474 (1989);
JudicialReview in Latin America, supra note 12, at 785; Phanor J. Eder, JudicialReview in
Latin America, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 570, 575-610 (1960).
107. Carpizo & Fix-Zamudio, supra note 106, at 34-40; Karst & Rosenn, supra note
23, at 210-40; JudicialReview in Latin America, supra note 12, at 791-806.
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for failing to redress human rights abuses."' 8 A Latin American
court, in many cases, will only prefer a constitution over a conflicting law, leaving an unconstitutional law on the books for
later application by the executive, producing the need for further litigation by citizens that were not parties to the prior litigation.1 09
As with any aspect of the legal systems of Latin America,
Scholars have
judicial review must be evaluated in context.1
asserted that the institutional characteristics of Latin American
judiciaries create incompatibilities with the concept of judicial
review. 1 ' Professor Jorge Correa Sutil, a Chilean legal scholar,
has posited that the Chilean Supreme Court's ineffectiveness in
redressing serious human rights abuses of the former Pinochet
regime is rooted in Latin American notions of judicial independence based on the traditional role of the judge as Merryman's
"expert clerk.""'
Correa Sutil relied on statements by Chilean
judges to support his thesis. In 1987 in a rare response to criticism for failing to redress human rights violations, the Chilean
Supreme Court said:
It has been said that the judiciary is weak, and that such weakness manifests itself in the incapacity to search for the ethical
ideals of the law and the Chilean society ....Courts are strict
and loyal law enforcers, law that continues to be for them the
written reason. According to such law, the judges ought to
decide the cases ... and they are not authorized to disdain
and deviate from this rule and look for general principles of
morality or law which could produce their decisions ....The
108. Correa Sutil, supra note 65, at 89; Vaughn, supra note 6, at 583-88.
109. Dale B. Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws: Context for Law and Development, 19 Am.J. COMP. L. 91, 101-02 (1971).

110. Correa Sutil, supra note 65, at 101; cf Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman,
In Context, 63 So. CAL. L. REv. 1597, 1600 (1990) (stating "[w]e mean to signal with
'context' a readiness, indeed an eagerness, to recognize patterns of differences that
have been used historically to distinguish among people, among places, and among
problems."); Ruth A. Pumam, Justice in Context, 63 So. CAL. L. REv. 1797, 1797 (1990);
Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 So. CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1727 (1990).
111. This Article deals with certain structural aspects of Latin American judiciaries.

Many other pressing problems exist for Latin American judiciaries, such as the physical
insecurity ofjudges and their families from drug cartel violence and terrorism, the lack
of modern computer equipment and facilities, and antiquated court administration.
These factors, which are external to the nature of Latin American legal systems, also

hinder judicial review.
112. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
Sutil, supra note 65, at 93.

THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION

14 (1993) quoted in Correa
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judges
are aware that they must be strict appliers of the
13
law.'
Correa Sutil contends that judges have been isolated from the
social realities in Chile. He does concede that based on a review
of Chilean court decisions, however, one could argue that the
courts have issued decisions which are contrary to law yet reflective of social values. 1 4 His main criticism is that, in a system in
which legal formalism is the dominant theory, it is very easy for
the judiciary to be socially isolated." 5
Correa Sutil concludes that the Chilean experience may
show that in order for a judiciary to be accountable, judges may
have to be "active political figures." 1 6 His view is that some form
of ideological representation is necessary for the judiciary. 1 7
Correa Sutil's position is remarkably similar to Alexis de Tocqueville's description of the role of federal judges in the United
States in his famous work, Democracy in America:
Not only must the Federal judges be good citizens, and men
of that information and integrity which are indispensable to
all magistrates, but they must be statesmen, wise to discern
the signs of the times, not afraid to brave the obstacles that
can be subdued, nor slow to turn away from the current when
it threatens to sweep them off, and the supremacy of the
Union and the obedience due to the laws along with them."'
De Tocqueville was speaking in the context of evaluating judges
as political figures because of every U.S. judge's power ofjudicial
review. De Tocqueville has been an influential authority in Latin
America on constitutions and judicial review.' 1 9
C. Evasion of Formal Law
Latin American lawyers and government officials have long
been familiar with techniques for accomplishing their tasks de113. Correa Sutil, supra note 65, at 93 (providing English translation of Chilean
Supreme Court statement in newspaper article).
114. See id. at 99.
115. Id. at 99-102.
116. Id. at 101.
117. Id. at 102.
118. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 151-52 (Vintage Books ed.,
1990).
119. See Carpizo & Fix-Zamudio, supra note 106, at 33; Professor Roberto G.
MacLean, Comparative Law: Latin America course, Georgetown University Law Center,
Fall 1994.
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spite inadequate or ineffective laws. In Latin America, it is routinely necessary to avoid the strict letter of the law, often in order
to accomplish seemingly legitimate transactions. Lawyers and
government officials thus face a dilemma similar to the dilemma
faced by judges.1 20
One of the most notable examples of such techniques in
Latin America is the jeito in Brazil.12 Jeito translates "roughly to
a knack, twist, way, or fix" intended to bend or evade legal
rules. 122 It has a variety of forms, some of which are undesirable,
such as the paying of a bribe to a government official, and others
which appear desirable from a social point of view, such as the
evasion of an unjust, economically inefficient, or anachronistic
law.1 23 In Brazil, the jeito has even been applied in conjunction
with Brazil's attempts to formalize the informals under its
Microenterprise Statute. 12 4 In Argentina, Chile, and Mexico,
parties to commercial transactions often resort to "simulations"
to accomplish their transactions.1 25 In Bolivia, the law precludes
banks from providing secured loans with real estate as collateral. 126 To provide credit secured on the basis of personal assets,
120. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Jr., et al., JudicialReform in Latin America: A Framework
for National Development, ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY 1, 3 (1995).
Indeed, the legal system in Latin America has become the butt of many jokes,
such as the sayings la movida para mis amigos, y la ley paramis enemigos (deals for
my friends, the law for my enemies) and hecha la ley, hecha la trampa (make the
law and then find a way around it).
Id.
121. TheJeito, supra note 45, at 514; Rosenn, supra note 90, at 1.
122. TheJeito, supra note 45, at 514.
123. Rosenn describes at least five different types of behavior:
(1) A government official fails to perform a legal duty because of private pecuniary or status gains ....
(2) A private citizen employs a subterfuge to
circumvent a legal obligation that is sensible and just (in an objective sense)
....
(3) A public servant performs his legal duty speedily only in exchange for
private pecuniary or status gains ....
(4) A private citizen circumvents a legal
obligation that is unrealistic, unjust, or economically inefficient ....
(5) A
public servant deviates from his legal duty because of his conviction that the
law is unrealistic, unjust, or economically inefficient ....
Rosenn, supra note 90, at 3. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Id.; TheJeito,
supra note 45, at 515-16.
124. Looye, supra note 41, at 132-36. See supra note 41 and accompanying text
(discussing Brazil's Microenterprise Statute and informals).
125. Boris Kozolchyk, Simulation and the Law Elsewhere in Latin America [hereinafter
Simulation and the Law], in LATIN AMERICAN LAw, BUSINESS, supra note 91, at 47.

126. WORLD BANK, OFFCE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIB.
BEAN REGION, How LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON COLLATERAL LIMIT ACCESS TO CREDIT IN BoLIA ii, 10 (1994).
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lenders and borrowers have resorted to a number of maneuvers.
In Bolivia, a bank may require a postdated check from a borrower to guarantee payment, even though the borrower does not
have sufficient funds in his or her bank account to pay the
check. In the event that the borrower defaults on the loan, the
bank will cash the check, the check will bounce, and the bank
will initiate criminal prosecution and seek ajail sentence for the
borrower. Furthermore, in Bolivia, a bank may also require a
bailee agreement that subjects the bailee, typically a close family
member of the borrower, to ajail sentence if the collateral is not
delivered. 27
'
In many Latin American countries, there has been a disregard for rules governing civil procedure, particularly where
those rules impose time constraints. Litigation in Latin America
progresses at an extremely slow pace. Case backlogs and delays
are endemic. Judges and lawyers often ignore time limitations
set forth even in "reformed" civil procedure codes. 12 The failure to follow rules of civil procedure is an astounding revelation
to a lawyer accustomed to litigation in the United States where
procedural rules tend to be strictly enforced. It is in procedure
where a great deal of certainty in the law may be established,
particularly with respect to deadlines.
Evasive behavior exists to some extent in all countries. One
has only to think back to the 1980's, when real estate tax shelters
were routinely used in the United States as effective tax avoidance schemes for persons in upper income brackets. The difference in Latin America, however, is the great frequency and regularity of these maneuvers, and their widespread acceptance by
Latin American lawyers, businessmen, and the populace generally. 2 9 Such devices obscure the law and its application and result in an undesirable lack of transparency in a legal system.
The numerous instances of evasion of law is yet another
manifestation in Latin American countries of an ambivalence towards law. In the context of creating devices to evade law, law is
"in the way" of perceived efficient and desirable transactions and
relationships. The idealistic belief in legislative supremacy has
127. Id.
128. Buscaglia, Jr., et al., supra note 120, at 10, 14.
129. TheJeito, supra note 45, at 515; Rosenn, supra note 90, at 2-3; Simulation and the
Law, supra note 125, at 48-49.
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resulted in a superabundance of confusing and inconsistent legislation which Latin Americans spend a great deal of time and
resources circumventing in their daily lives. Latin Americans
thus exhibit both a basic faith in the "ideal of law" 18 0 and a "rule1
13
oblivious mentality.'

D. De Facto Regimes
Latin American governments have been characterized by
swings between civilian and military rule and between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. In many discordant political
situations, Latin American legislatures have been dissolved, and
executives have passed laws in the form of decree laws. The
existence of democracy in virtually all of the countries in Latin
America is a recent phenomenon. Whether democracy will consolidate in Latin America remains an open question.
The typical Latin American constitution provides for representative government as the only legitimate public order, with
power based on popular sovereignty and the consent of the governed. A recent example is Peru's 1993 Constitution. The Peruvian Constitution provides that "[n]o person, organization,
Armed Force, National Police, or sector of the community may
arrogate upon itself the exercise of such power. To do so would
constitute rebellion or sedition." t32 The Peruvian Constitution
further provides that "[n]o one owes obedience to a usurping
government or to those assuming public functions in violation of
the Constitution and of the laws. The civilian population has the
right of insurgency in defense of the constitutional order. The
acts of those who usurp public functions are null and void."' 33
Because no coup in Peru has occurred since the promulgation
of this new Constitution, these provisions have yet to be tested.
The reality is that the de facto government M doctrine is long130. Cf John Linarelli, An Examination of the Proposed Crime of Intervention in the
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
1, 44 (1995) (discussing similar approach of Latin American and other delegates to
U.N. International Law Commission).

131. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 9.
132. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU, art. 45, reprinted in GISBERT H. FLANZ ED.,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 28 (1995).

133. Id. art. 46.
134. SeeJ. Irizarry y Puente, The Nature and Powers of a "DeFacto" Government in Latin
America, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 15, 25 (1955) (defining defacto government as government that
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standing in Peru, as it is in other Latin American countries. 13 5
The defacto government doctrine provides that laws promulgated by unconstitutional rulers are treated as legitimate by the
judiciary both during the existence of the unconstitutional regime and after its demise, even when a constitutional order follows the unconstitutional order."' 6 As Dale Furnish explained in
the context of Peru:
Peru's turbulent political history has given rise to many existing "laws" which were promulgated unilaterally by military
or other extra-constitutional governing bodies. These norms
are designated Decreto-Leyes (decree-laws). Peruvian and other
Latin American practice has made a pragmatic adjustment to
the recurring interruptions of the constitutional system, by
simply recognizing the inevitability of such events and incorporating them into the Rule of Law. According to the weight
of Latin American authority, general decree-laws should not
be permanently effective without Congressional consent
upon resumption of constitutional government, which sooner
or later follows dictatorship almost as surely as dictatorship
follows constitutional government. However, tacit consent by
the reinstated Congress seems sufficient. "The Peruvian
Supreme Court has held that all Decreto-Leyes not expressly
derogated or modified
by a succeeding Congress are im1 37
pliedly approved."
The doctrine is so entrenched in Latin America that the numbering scheme for laws is continued
in the successive
1 38
nondemocratic and democratic orders.
The Supreme Court of Argentina set forth the modern origins of the doctrine in a 1930 accord.1 3 9 In 1983, the Supreme
"usurps power by force in violation of established constitutional and legal forms of succession . .

").

135. See Furnish, supra note 109, at 95, 109.
136. Id.; see Ziella v. Smiriglio Hnos., 209 Fallos 25, 27 (1947) (recognizing that de
facto government has equal plenary powers of constitutional government).
137. Furnish, supra note 109, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
138. Roberto G. MacLean, Comparative Law: Latin America course, Georgetown
University Law Center, Fall 1994.
139. Acordada, Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina, 158 Fallos 290 (1930), repninted in KARST & ROSENN, supra note 23, at 194-95. The Supreme Court of Argentina
first recognized a defacto law as valid in 1865. Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos 127, 142-43
(1865); see Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise ofJudicialReview in South America [hereinafter
Exercise ofJudicial Review], in TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 317-19 (summarizing defacto doctrine in Argentina). The defacto doctrine lay dormant from 1865
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Court of Argentina found a defacto law that the former military
regime enacted to be null and void on the basis that the successor democratic government must ratify de facto laws.1 4 The
Court thus abandoned the de facto government doctrine in
1983.4 In 1990, however, a Supreme Court packed by Presi143
dent Carlos Menem 14 2 revitalized the doctrine.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR A COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCEPHILOSOPHERSAD ANTI-PHILOSOPHERS
Jurisprudence'" has an uncertain relationship to the comparative study of legal systems. Jurisprudential thought seems to

have some capability to move across national borders. One only
until the 1930 accord. Id.; see HoRAcio VERBITSKY, HACER LA CORTE 154-58 (1993)
(summarizing modem treatment of the defacto doctrine).
140. Aramayo, 306 Fallos 72, 73-74 (1984); see Soria contra Dir. Nac. de Vialidad,
307 Fallos 338, 343 (1985) (stating that ratification may be either express or implicit);
Radil R. Alfonsin, The Function ofJudicialPower During the Transition, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 50-52 (outlining defacto doctrine in Argentina since restoration of democracy in the 1980's); Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 13.
141. Alfonsin, supra note 140, at 50-52; Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 13.
142. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 8; see generally VERBrrsKy, supra note 139, at 4752 (detailing President Menem's expansion of Supreme Court from five to nine Justices
and political alliances between President Menem and new Justices).
143. Godoy v. Universidad Nacional de la Plata, [1991-Il] J.A. 455, 459 (1990);
Gaggiamo Provincia de Santa Fe, [1992-D] L.L. 481, 488; Pignatoro, [1992-D] L.L. 82,
88 (1991); Alfonsin, supra note 140, at 50-52; Stotzky & Nino, supra note 7, at 13.
144. Judge Richard Posner's definition of 'jurisprudence," which is instructive for
purposes of this paper, is as follows:
By 'jurisprudence" I mean the most fundamental, general, and theoretical
plane of analysis of the social phenomenon called law. For the most part it
deals with problems, and uses perspectives, remote from the daily concerns of
legal practitioners: problems that cannot be solved by reference to or by reasoning from conventional legal materials; perspectives that cannot be reduced
to legal doctrines or to legal reasoning. Many of the problems of jurisprudence cross doctrinal, temporal, and national boundaries.
"Philosophy" is the name we give to the analysis of fundamental questions; thus the traditional definition ofjurisprudence as the philosophy of law,
or as the application of philosophy to law, is primafacieappropriate. Problems
ofjurisprudence include whether and in what sense law is objective (determinate, impersonal) and autonomous rather than political or personal; the
meaning of legal justice; the appropriate and the actual role of the judge; the
role of discretion in judging; the origins of law; the place of social science and
moral philosophy in law; the role of tradition in law; the possibility of making
law a science; whether law progresses; and the problematics of interpreting
legal texts.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE xi (1990) [hereinafter PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE].
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has to take a cursory look at the European literature using the
"law in the books - law in action" distinction of Roscoe Pound
and other legal realists, and the emergence of law and economics in Europe, to appreciate this phenomenon. 4 On the other
hand, jurisprudence is informed most dramatically by the legal
culture, intellectual style, and national identity of a given society.
One only has to read the numerous articles and books devoted
to jurisprudence in the United States to appreciate the
grounded nature of jurisprudence in a national sense of law.
In Latin America, U.S. law is a significant influence, due in
no small part to the fact that many Latin American lawyers study
law in the United States.1 46 Based on the structural or cultural
characteristics of Latin American legal systems described in the
preceding section, Latin American judges, legislators, and practicing lawyers may be in a good position to appreciate and embrace certain North American schools of jurisprudence. Legal
realism, particularly the teachings of Karl Llewellyn, with his idea
of legislating to conform to social realities, seems to have at least
implicitly penetrated the consciousness of many individuals in
Latin American legal communities. Yet the overt acceptance of
realist jurisprudence by Latin American scholars has been limited. Although some are open to realistjurisprudence, they treat
it as a foreign object.1 4 7 In the United States, the realist school
has evolved (or devolved, depending on one's perspective) into
pragmatism and critical legal studies. Some suggest that even
law and economics is an outgrowth of realism, 4 ' which is open
to debate, given the strong positivist nature of the law and economics movement and its basis in only one social science. Set
145. Ugo Mattei, Comment, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadershipin Western
Law, 42 Am.J. Comp. L. 195, 206 (1994).
146. Id. at 207.
147. See Gregorio Robles, La decisi6n en el derecho y la t6pica juridica, 18 BOLETiN
MEXICGAO DE DERECHO CoMPARADo 951, 965 (1985) (relying mainly on European
sources); Witker, supra note 61, at 38; Eder, supra note 106. at 613 (discussing Argentin-

ean scholar Charles Cossio's advocating more creative role for judiciary); El poder discrecional, supra note 84, at 12; Josef L. Kunz, An Introduction to Latin-American Philosophy of
Law, 15 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 259, 259-61 (1964) [hereinafter Latin-AmericanPhilosophy];
Josef L. Kunz, Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy of Law, 3 Am.J. COMp. L. 212, 212
(1954) [hereinafter Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy];Josef L. Kunz, Latin-American Philosophy of Law in the Twentieth Century, 24 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 283, 473, 801 (1949)
[hereinafter Law in the Twentieth Century].
148. J.M.

KELLY,

A

SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY

436-37 (1992).
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forth below is an exploration of dominant ideas in U.S. jurisprudence and their relationship to Latin American law.
A. Philosophy and Anti-Philosophy: Law and Anti-Law
The legal cultures of Latin America and the United States
diverge on fundamental tenets. Legal culture in Latin America
is heavily influenced by nineteenth century rationalism and the
proposition that law can be reduced to science. Hans Kelsen
and his seminal theory, the Pure Theory of Law, are of profound
significance in Latin America. Legal culture in the United
States, in contrast, has undergone an anti-formalist revolution
characterized by skepticism towards abstract theories that rely
only on legal principles, on a view of law as social policy rather
than as science, and on a questioning of the value and comprehension of law itself as an independent area of social inquiry.
To understand the differences between Latin American and
North American philosophies of law, one must understand the
dialectic between philosophy and anti-philosophy.' 4 9 The concept of dialectic is used because philosophy and anti-philosophy
both are part of philosophy, yet they are in tension with each
other. A significant way of thinking about law in the United
States is on the basis of pragmatism. By now we are all familiar
with Holmes' anti-formalist slogan that the life of the law is not
logic but experience. 5 ' Pragmatism and its parent of sorts, realism, have been ascendant ideas in U.S. philosophy and jurisprudence during the middle and latter parts of the twentieth century. The influential philosophical thinking of continental Europe, however, has been existentialism and phenomenology. 5 '
These differing schools of philosophy deal with the same thing,
the realities of the twentieth century. It isjust that they deal with
these realities in different ways.
The legal pragmatist school in the United States is contro149. See

THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:

SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDI-

(Richard A.
Posner ed., 1992) (discussing Posner's views on philosophy and anti-philosophy);
Brietzke, supra note 2, at 52-55 (discussing use of dialectical method).
150. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 793
(1989).
151. See supra note 147 (discussing articles by Kunz). General philosophical ideas
are borrowed here because jurisprudence often grows from or is influenced by philosophy.
CIAL OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITING OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. Xviii
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versial. The school has its basis in the writings of two philosophers, the founder of the pragmatist school, John Dewey, and
the contemporary proponent of the school, Richard Rorty. One
of the fundamental tenets of the school is nonfoundationalism,
which is "[t]he notion that there exists no absolute truth, no
privileged text, no God's-eye point of view ....
52
The anti-philosophical thinking that is pertinent to this discussion is the "old" pragmatism of judges like Holmes and Cardozo. These figures are distinct from the "new" pragmatists, in
that, among other things, they believed that certain truths existed, possibly not in religion or philosophy, but at least in history and culture.1 53 The distinction is between an attitude of
pragmatism, as opposed to a philosophy of pragmatism,
although there is no doubt the two ways of thinking are significantly related.'5 4
This attitude of pragmatism, as found in the United States,
is identified in stark fashion by de Tocqueville, who said:
I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have no philosophical school of their own, and they
care but little for all the schools into which Europe is divided,
155
the very names of which are scarcely known to them.
De Tocqueville found the people of the United States to be people of action, whose "social condition deters them from speculative studies."1 56
152. Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 155, 155 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
Legal pragmatism is inherently contradictory, as it is expressed in its contemporary
form by legal scholars in the United States. It attempts to cut through formalism and
metaphysical constructs with its own form of abstraction and terminology. It is a layering of ideas that fails to promote a better understanding of how law works in society and
that fails to result in coherent theories concerning law. It is "anti-law" in approach in
that it requires lawyers to look at everything "in context," when lawyers, by their nature
and training, are poor social scientists and unable to discern context in a rigorous way,
separated from their own subjective predilections and biases.
153. See PROBLEMS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 144, at 26-29.
154. One Irish scholar describes Roscoe Pound's use of the phrase "social engineering" as "a characteristic American piece of imagery, its deliberately unpretentious
evocation of blue overalls and functional workshop contrasting with the elaborate abstractions of European jurists . . . ." KELLY, supra note 148, at 363.
155. DE TOCQUEVILLE, Vol. II, supra note 118, at 3.
156. Id. at 4.
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De Tocqueville set forth the "principal characteristics" of
the "philosophical methods of the Americans" as:
To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims,
class opinions, and in some degree, of national prejudices; to
accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing
facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing
better; to seek the reasons of things for oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend to results without being bound to means,
and to strike through the form to the substance ....
De Tocqueville was a continental European observing society in
the United States. He is quite influential in Latin America and,
thus, may be perceived by Latin Americans as having an outsider's or "looking glass" view of society in the United States.
This anti-philosophical attitude in the United States has influenced the major U.S. schools of jurisprudence.
The ideological and conceptual bases for thinking about
law in Latin America are found in continental Europe, notably
in Austria. In order to understand law in Latin America, one
must understand the writings of Hans Kelsen, the leading figure
in Latin American jurisprudence.1 58 Scholar Roberto MacLean
has remarked that lawyers in Latin America do not know the
names of Supreme Court justices, but they are all familiar with
Kelsen and his Pure Theory of Law and have read at least one of
his seminal works, The General Theory of Law and State.15 9 ProfessorJosef Kunz has said, "It] he Latins think that the Pure Theory
of Law is a product of intrinsic greatness which will remain incorporated in the thinking of jurists; that, to quote one phrase,
157. Id. at 3.
158. See Latin-American Philosophy, supra note 147, at 267-68 (stating, "[blut the
greatest, and overwhelming, influence exercised in Spanish-American contemporary
philosophy of law is that of Hans Kelsen, the founder of the 'Vienna School,' the creator of the 'Pure Theory of Law."'). Kelsen's influence in Latin America is obvious when
one reviews Latin American legal literature. Many Latin American works cite to or
discuss Kelsen. See e.g., Oscar Correas, La sociologia del derecho como condici6n de lajurisprudenciaen Kelsen, 22 BOLETiN MEXIc.ANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 403 (1989); Carpizo
& Fix-Zamudio, supra note 106, at 31; Ulises Schmill Ord6fiez, El concepto del derecho en

las teorias de Weber y de Kelsen, 18
(1985);

BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO

HECTOR GERARDO ZERTUCHE

GARcLA,

113

LA JURISPRUDENCIA EN EL SISTEMA JURIDICO

MEXiCANO 3 (1992); see generally Miguel Villoro Toranzo, INTRODUCCION
DERECHO 1 (1987).

AL ESTUDIO DEL

159. Professor Roberto G. MacLean, Comparative Law: Latin America course, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1994; see generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAW AND STATE 1 (1945) (presenting Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law).
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all philosophy of law in the future will have to be a dialogue with
60

Kelsen."1
Kelsen was an arialytical positivist. 16 1 He eschewed sociolog-

ical and realist jurisprudence. 16 2 His hierarchy of norms, as set
forth in his Pure Theory of Law, serves as the theoretical framework for the legal systems of Latin America. All norms in a legal
order are postulated on the basis of a basic legal norm. "The
basic norm of a positive legal order is nothing but the fundamental rule according to which the various norms of the order
are to be created."' 63 To Kelsen, law is science, the product of
reason, free from any moral or political judgments, and separate
from the concept of justice. Justice and law are "confused" as
the same in "non-scientific political thought." 164 In Kelsen's
Pure Theory of Law, law is apolitical, certain, logical, and rational. Some Latin American legal scholars have attempted to
extend or combine Kelsen's theory with phenomenological or
65
existential philosophies.

Kelsen's theory and law as science have a strong appeal in
the context of a diverse society. Professors W. Michael Reisman
and Aaron M. Schreiber explain, "Kelsen's work was rooted in
the Austro-Hungarian empire, a complex of many different and
discrete ethnic and language groups, each with it own authority
dynamic and its own exclusive moral code.' 1 66 According to
Reisman and Schreiber, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law "opens the
way for compromise" among diverse groups who feel protected
from the "potentially tyrannical views of the majority."1 67 The
difficulty with Kelsen's theory for Latin America, however, is that
it requires a strong legislatively-based political order that can
promulgate adequate laws to work the compromise. Latin
America, however, has been plagued by extremely weak or nonexistent legislatures, and excessive and deficient executive
branch lawmaking.
160. Latin-American Philosophy, supra note 147, at 272.
161. KELLY, supra note 148, at 384.
162. KELSEN, supra note 159, at 162-71, 175.

163. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 5.

ING

165. Latin-American Philosophy, supra note 147, at 276-78.
166. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE:
AND SHAPING LAw 402 n.2 (1987).
167. Id.

UNDERSTAND-
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B. Constructive Borrowings: Potential or Actual?
The descriptions and critiques of attributes of Latin American legal systems, as set forth in the preceding section, and the
divergences between law and society recognized by lawyers in
Latin America, indicate that a philosophy of law, reminiscent of
the legal realist movement that dominated legal thought in the
United States in decades past, may be developing in Latin
America. Ronald Dworkin's principles for deciding "hard cases"
and the law and economics movement offer means of additional
inquiry into Latin American jurisprudence.
1. Realism
Jerome Frank, a leading figure in the legal realist movement
in the United States, wrote in one of his famous works:
Even in a relatively static society, men have never been able to
construct a comprehensive, eternized set of rules anticipating
all possible legal disputes and settling them in advance. Even
in such a social order no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events; situations are bound
to occur which were never contemplated when the original
rules were made. How much less is such a frozen legal system
in modern times. New instruments of production, new
modes of travel and of dwelling, new credit and ownership
devices, new concentrations of capital, new social customs,
habits, aims and ideals - all these factors of innovation make
vain the hope that definitive legal rules can be drafted that
will forever after solve all legal problems. When human relationships are transforming daily, legal relationships cannot be
expressed in enduring form. The constant development of
unprecedented problems requires a legal system capable of
fluidity and pliancy. Our society would be strait-jacketed were
not the courts, with the able assistance of lawyers, constantly
overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of everchanging social, industrial and political conditions; although
changes cannot be made lightly, yet law must be more or less
impermanent, experimental and therefore not nicely calculable. Much of the uncertainty of law 1is68 not an unfortunate
accident; it is of immense social value.
De Soto, Correa Sutil, MacLean, Paris Rodriguez, and others
have expressed strikingly similar ideas about how law should
168. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6 (1930).
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function in Latin American societies. The legal realists, however, differ in fundamental ways from Kelsen and the Vienna
school.
Latin American legal systems appear to be frozen in a formalist model that compares closely to the "classical era of formalism" in the United States during the nineteenth century and
prior to the New Deal. 6 9 This model is based on a philosophy of
law in which private law is dominant, and complements the notion that private parties self-regulate in a free market system.
One author describes the pre-New Deal period in the United
States as:
[T] he classical era started with the notion of a self-regulating
market system, a private sphere insulated from government
interference, influence and control. It then added the belief
in a formalistic method of legal reasoning. Roscoe Pound
called formalism "mechanical jurisprudence" because classical lawyers had a tendency to apply their general principles
relentlessly - regardless of the underlying policies or consequences of these policies in specific cases. Judicial method
was seen as scientific, apolitical, principled, objective, logical,
and rational.
Legal argument was pervaded with a sense of
7
certainty.

0

When comparing this state of affairs in the United States to
Latin America, the Latin American legal systems appear to be
fixed on a myth of a classical market economy system that does
not really exist in fact. 7 1 The above critiques of Latin American
law indicate that formalist approaches to law have permitted
elites and corporatist groupings, grounded firmly in the formal
sector, to remain dominant.172 The myth remains intact as
judges trained in the classical style of law, ignorant of commercial and social realities and of public law approaches at regulation, dominate the judiciaries in Latin America. 7 The myth
continues, moreover, despite the regulation by Latin American
169. See Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 496 (1988).
170. Id.
171. DE SOTO, supra note 24, at 201.
172. Cf Wiarda, supra note 15, at 448 (stating, "[t]he role of law in this [the Latin
American corporatist] system is exceedingly important, for it is legal recognition that
gives legitimacy to a group and makes its existence formally recognized. Legal recognition by the government is the sine quw non for the activities of any organized interest
. . . .1

.)

173. See CrwL

LAw TRADITION,

supra note 17, at 147-48; see also supra notes 55-105
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governments, until recently, of virtually all spheres of economic
activity and their purported promotion of development through
extensive government intervention in the economy.
Realism in the United States was, in substantial part, a reaction to the formalism in the legal system that prevented the implementation of New Deal policies. 174 It was at once responsive
to social forces and market realities. It has been hailed as the
first break of the United States from European schools of jurisprudence, and the first school of U.S. jurisprudence.1 75 Realism,
however, shares some similarities to the teachings of certain late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century European jurists,
notably Rudolph Von Jhering and Francois Geny 1 76 Some Latin
American jurists, such as Eduardo Garcia Mdynez and Luis Recas~ns Siches, have been influenced by realism, but are still
177
grounded firmly in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.
Perhaps we are seeing a convergence of philosophies based
on a need for, in the words of Recasdns Siches, a "non-academic"
philosophy of law178 or, in the words of Charles Mwalimu, a
"functionalist" jurisprudence. 179 Such a jurisprudence could be
and accompanying text (discussing Latin American judiciaries' failure to reconcile law
with social realities).
174. Singer, supra note 169, at 477-99; Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush:
From Legal Realism to CriticalLegal Scholarship, 95 HAv. L. REv. 1669, 1674-75 (1982). A
contrary position is that realism lost vitality with the New Deal, when statutory and administrative law gained prominence. "Realist jurisprudence was not ajurisprudence of
the modern regulatory state." Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal Realism,
12 LEGAL STUD., 137, 140 (1992).
175. N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of RealisticJurisprudence: A Prequel to the
Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1303 (1989).
176. KELLY, supra note 148, at 332-33, 362; REISMAN & SCHREIBER, supra note 166, at
434. There was a significant German "free law movement" in the first third of the twentieth century. The scholars of this movement posited that no code could possibly deal
with all cases, and that the classical model of the civil law and the civilian judge would
cause absurd results. The major figures in this movement were Eugen Ehrlich and
Ernst Fuchs. Unfortunately, the Nazi regime in Germany perverted the teachings of the
movement to sinister ends and even relied on the movement to enact vague criminal
code provisions that plainly violated the axiom nullum crimen sine lege. KELLY, supra note
148, at 359-61. There was also a Scandinavian legal realism movement, which is quite
different from the U.S. movement. The Scandinavians sought to explain what the law
"really" is by using psychological concepts, mainly by examining mental responses to
words commonly used in a legal system. Id. at 369.
177. Latin-American Philosophy, supra note 147, at 279-81.
178. Id. at 281.
179. M. Mwalimu, The Need for a FunctionalistJurisprudencefor Developing Countries in
Africa, 1986 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 39 (1986).
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based on a moderate vision of Karl Llewellyn's realism.
For purposes of analyzing Latin American law, two points
stand out with respect to Llewellyn's view of law: 1) his approach
to drafting legislation, and 2) his vision of "grand style" judging.1 0 Llewellyn probably is the most compelling of the realist
thinkers in the context of Latin America because of his emphasis
on codification. He is also a moderate realist with a more temperate approach than Jerome Frank or Thurman Arnold. It is
noteworthy that Llewellyn spent time in 8Germany and authored
works in German on the common law.1 '
Llewellyn was of the view that law, in particular codes,
should fit the society it is intended to serve. His vision for the
Uniform Commercial Code was that it reflect the better practices of merchants, while making unlawful certain "sharp"
merchant
practices that could be viewed as against public pol82
icy.'

He attempted to make the Uniform Commercial Code

different in approach to what he viewed as needless abstractions
in Williston's Uniform Sales
Act, the predecessor law to the Uni83
form Commercial Code.1

Llewellyn proposed a grand style ofjudging, in which judges
interpreted legislation in accordance with its purpose and reason.'
This type of judging took account of the law in a social
context. Judges, moreover, could balance interests of parties,
and engage in a more discursive informal logic in rendering decisions. Llewellyn's view was that such a judging style would
render the decisions ofjudges more transparent. The parties to
the case, as well as the public, would be told the true reasons for
85
the judge's decision.
Although Llewellyn-like approaches have been recommended for Latin America, realism is not a panacea for Latin
America. Realism would seem to require a consolidation of democracy with a strong emphasis on human rights.' a In Nazi
180. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HAv. L. REv. 465 (1987).
181. Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 705, 706 (1992).
182. Wiseman, supra note 180, at 471-72, 493-97.
183. Id. at 47-77.
184. Id. at 496-99.
185. Id.
186. See Duxbury, supra note 174, at 144 (discussing criticism of realism as anti-

democratic).
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Germany, for example, judges disregarded rules in order to effectuate pernicious social goals.1 8 7 There are strong arguments
for a natural law theory as the basis for human rights and democracy.18 8 There would seem to be some requirement for basic
norms or morals to identify bad practices in society that are
against public policy. For example, a significant problem in
Latin America has been the acceptance of military and civilian
nondemocratic regimes as defacto governments, and acceptance
of laws promulgated by such unconstitutional regimes as valid.' 89
Should such practices really be accepted as part of the social reality in Latin America?
2. Additional Basis for Inquiry
There are two other styles or schools of jurisprudence that
may provide some fruitful points of inquiry for Latin America.
The first is Professor Ronald Dworkin's principles for deciding
"hard cases." The second point of inquiry is the law and economics movement in the United States.
a. Dworkin's Principles
In his criticism of the positivism of constitutional scholar
H.L.A. Hart, Dworkin sets forth some constructive views that may
be interpreted as bridging the gap between the ideal of the common lawjudge and the ideal of the civil lawjudge. Dworkin is of
the view that answers exist to hard cases and that lawyers:
[M]ake use of standards that do not function as rules, but
operate differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of
standards. Positivism ... is a model of and for a system of

rules, and its central notion of a single fundamental test for
law forces us to miss the important roles of these standards
that are not rules.... I call "policy" that kind of standard that
sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in
187. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between realism and teachings of late nineteenth and early twentieth century European jurists Von
Jhering and Geny); Somek, supra note 93, at 762-63 (noting accommodative approaches of German judges in handling cases which are not addressed directly by German Civil Code).
188. See Duxbury, supra note 174, at 166 (discussing natural law and Thomist Catholic legal scholars who reacted against realism).
189. See Exercise of Judicial Review, supra note 139, at 317 (describing Argentine
Supreme Court's recognition of defacto laws as, "the most obvious contribution to the
impairment of the democratic process on the part of the Supreme Court.").
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some economic, political, or social feature of the community
(though some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that
some present feature is to be protected from adverse
change). I call a "principle" a standard that is to be observed,
not because it will advance or secure an economic, political,
or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of
morality.190

Although Dworkin is not a realist, his jurisprudence may provide
a theoretical framework for advancing the idea ofjudicial discretion in Latin America. One criticism of this approach is that
Dworkin seems to be describing a state of affairs that already exists, at least in theory, in Latin America. Codes in the civil law
tradition are drafted in deliberately broad language in order to
cover a plethora of situations. Code interpretations in a civil law
court are liberal in scope in order to effectuate the intent of the
legislature. Thus, the paradigmatic civilian judge may in effect
be required to operate, at least to some extent, in accordance
with Dworkin's theories.
b. Law and Economics
The law and economics movement is not significant in Latin
America.'
Law and economics may provide Latin America with
some fresh ideas on how to make a positivist approach to law
socially relevant.' 9 2 Law and economics jurisprudence possesses
some formal characteristics. Economics is formulated almost exclusively in mathematics. 9 3 Economics is also dominated by positivist thought. Economists make rigid distinctions between fact
and value and seek to establish a value-neutral setting for economic theory. 194

Economic analysis of law may have positivist and formal fea190.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

22 (1978).

191. R. Cooter & J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present,
Future, 11 INT'L REv%.
L. & ECON. 261, 261 (1991). See <http://www.findlaw.com/lalea

(discussing Latin American Law and Economics Association).
192. See Avery Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics (Mar. 15,

1995) <http://WWW.11.georgetown.edu/lc/>. "[F]oremost among the cultural differences between law and economics is [the] economist's commitment to positivism." Id.
Positivism is "under substantial attack" in philosophy and in most other social sciences.
193. PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 144, at 361.
194. Katz, supra note 192, at 1.
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tures,1 95 yet it involves the use of nonlegal facts and methods. As
a method of inquiry, it is susceptible to systematic exposition in
its search for core legal principles, but without a self-contained
reliance on only legal rules and hierarchies.1 9 6 Like Kelsen, law
and economics scholars search for the essential norms governing
society. Like the legal realists, they seek the real reasons for
1 97
legal rules.
Of course, significant limitations may exist in the application of law and economics in Latin America. The law and economics movement has been widely criticized for, among other
things, failing to address the distribution of wealth and rights
and failing to deal with social goals other than economic efficiency and wealth maximization. These and other criticisms, no
doubt, would be of significance in the application of law and
economics to societies characterized by wide disparities in income distribution, such as in many Latin American countries.
These and other points would have to be flushed out by scholars
who, hopefully, will make further inquiries to succeed the inquiries of this Article.
CONCLUSION
As Latin American countries continue to consolidate democratic rule, a fundamental reordering and strengthening of state
functions will inevitably have to occur. A great challenge to
courts, legislatures, and executive branches in Latin America will
be whether they will promote or hinder development. All of
these institutions - the entire apparatus of government - are
involved in the law.
Given the complex and interwoven aspects of any society,
the effect of law on development is virtually impossible to isolate,
except in limited circumstances. In this Article, I have attempted to make some inquiries into the fundamental features
of Latin American legal culture, and into certain themes injurisprudence that have the potential for cross-border applications.
Comparative inquiry that focuses on the structural rather than
the technical and on the foundations rather than on the trimmings are beneficial for both the studying and the studied legal
195. Id.
196. See PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 144, at 442.
197. See id. (comparing law and economics to legal philosophy of Holmes).
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culture. It is my hope that my analysis will be of some use to
Latin Americans involved in law-related functions. I believe, however, that it is by now indisputable that there are no blueprints
or quick fixes for legal reform; there is no jeito that will reconcile
law and social reality.

